In this paper we extend the notion of Shapley value to the stochastic cooperative games. We give the definition of marginal vector to the stochastic cooperative games and we define the Shapley value for this game. Furthermore, we discuss the axioms of the Shapley value and give the proofs of these axioms.
Introduction
In general, the payoffs of a coalition in cooperative games are assumed to be known with certainty. In many cases, however, payoffs to coalitions are uncertain. If the formation of coalitions and allocations has to take place before the payoffs are realized, standard cooperative game theory can not be applied. Suijs et al. (1995) considered cooperative games with stochastic payoffs, the model introduced by Suijs et al. (1995) is explicitly incorporates preferences on stochastic payoffs for each agent and allows each coalition to choose from several actions. continue on the model introduced by Suijs et al. (1995) . They extend the definitions of superadditivity and convexity for TU games to stochastic cooperative games. Furthermore, they show that a stochastic cooperative game has a nonempty core.
In this paper we take the model introduced by as a basis. We define the Shapley value of stochastic cooperative games. Furthermore, we discuss the axioms of the Shaley value. This paper is organized as follows. In section2 we introduce basic definitions concerning stochastic cooperative games. Section3 presents our main results. The axioms for Shapley value of stochastic cooperative game.
Stochastic cooperative games
Let us first recall some of the definitions concerning stochastic cooperative games as introduced by . A stochastic cooperative game is described by a tuple
where N is the set of agents, S A the nonempty and finite set of actions a coalition S can take, X a L R with finite expectation, and i the preference relation of agent i over the set 1 ( ) L R of stochastic payoffs with finite expectation. We assume that for each player the preferences are complete, transitive and continuous. Furthermore, we assume that
for all a A . The class of all cooperative games with stochastic payoffs with agent set N is denoted by ( ) SG N .To simplify notation, however, we restrict our attention to the case that each coalition only has one action to take, that is, 
Now we extend the notion of marginal vector to the stochastic cooperative games. There have two properties of the carrier:
(1). Let T be the carrier of , then for all
T is the carrier of too.
Because, for all S N , we have 
Axioms for the Shapley value
We give one axiomatization for the Shapley value of stochastic cooperative game. We consider the axioms: 
Then the Shapley value of stochastic cooperative game is the vector that satisfies the axioms above.
Lemma1. The definition of (1)
n is the Shapley value of ( ) SG N .
Proof. (1) Efficiency axiom. Let T be the carrier of , according to the property (2) of the carrier, we have
(2). Symmetry axiom. Let be a permutation of N , which satisfies formula (2), then we have S S , and for 
, for all i T .
While , i j T , and i j , let be a permutation of N , such that , , 
